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OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Worker's Compensation: Subrogation: Does the
Insurance Carrier's Right Exist Independent of the
Workers' Compensation Statute?
On April 13, 1982, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals decided the case of
Russell v. Bill Hodges Truck Co.' In short, the court held that section 44(a)
of Title 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes2 preempted any other right of subroga-
tion that may have existed at common law for workers' compensation in-
surance carriers. The purpose of this note is to examine the court of appeal's
decision in Russell and determine whether this was a correct application of
the law in light of prior Oklahoma law.
In Russell, a worker was injured on the job when he came into contact
with a high-voltage electrical line. Aetna Life and Casualty Company, the
workers' compensation insurance carrier, paid the worker $121,325 as com-
pensation for his injuries and for medical expenses. The worker then sued a
third party, Bill Hodges Truck Company, for injuries sustained in the acci-
dent. Prior to trial, Bill Hodges Truck Company executed a compromise set-
tlement with the worker and Aetna in the amount of $750,000. Aetna claimed
subrogation for $121,325, the amount it had paid the worker up to that time.
The parties were unable to agree on a division of the settlement fund and the
worker applied to the district court for an apportionment pursuant to section
44(a).
The trial court apportioned the $121,325 half to the worker and half to
Aetna under the theory that whenever an injured employee recovers damages
from a third party by way of a compromise settlement, it is presumed that
the employee recovered less than the full amount of his damages. Aetna
1. 53 OKLA. B.J. 985 (Okla. App. Apr. 13, 1982) (unpub. op.). Although Russell is an un-
published opinion and therefore not binding precedent, the case is indicative of the analysis the
court may use in the future and as such will be fully examined in light of its persuasive value.
2. 85 OKLA. STAT. § 44(a) (1981) provides:
If a worker entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act is
injured or killed by negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, such
worker shall, before any suit or claim under the Workers' Compensation Act, elect
whether to take compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act, or to pursue
his remedy against such other. Such election shall be evidenced in such manner as
the Administrator may by rule or regulation prescribe. If he elects to take compen-
sation under the Workers' Compensation Act, the cause of action against such
other shall be assigned to the insurance carrier liable to the payment of such com-
pensation . ..
In the event that recovery is effected by compromise settlement, then in that
event the expenses, attorney fees and the balance of the recovery may be divided
between the employer or insurance company having paid compensation and the
employee or his representatives as they may agree. Provided, that in the event they
are unable to agree, then the same shall be apportioned by the district court having
jurisdiction of the employee's action against such other person, in such manner as
is just and reasonable.
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appealed, claiming that it was entitled to the full amount of the subrogation
claim less a proportionate share of expenses and attorneys' fees.
Aetna relied on Stinchcomb v. Dodson3 which held that a compensation
carrier's subrogation claim could be brought by a subrogated insurer in its
own name and independent of the provisions of section 44.4 The court of
appeals recognized the holding in Stinchcomb, but found it to be inapplicable
to the case at bar. First, the court found that section 44 had been amended
several times since the Stinchcomb decision and thus held that "today, its
provisions are so comprehensive that they preempt any other right of
subrogation which may exist at common law or otherwise."' Second, the
court believed Stinchcomb to be an overbroad statement of the law, finding
that two later cases, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Associates Transports,
Inc.6 and Updike Advertising System v. State Industrial Commission,' in-
dicated that the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered compensation
insurers' subrogation claims to be creatures of and subject to legislative
discretion. Thus, the court in Russell rejected Aetna's argument and affirmed
the trial court insofar as it prorated Aetna's subrogated claim 50/50 with the
injured worker. In order to shed some light on this confused area of the law,
an examination of both statutory and case law is required.
The Stinchcomb and Staples Cases
The landmark case in this area is the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision
in Stinchcomb v. Dodson.8 In Stinchcomb, Clarence Crain, an employee of
3. 190 Okla. 643, 126 P.2d 257 (1942).
4. Id. at 645, 126 P.2d at 259, 260. Irrespective of the argument that employers and in-
surance carriers have a right to subrogation independent of section 44, a responsible workers'
compensation act should provide for full reimbursement of the employer/carrier if either the
employee or the employer/carrier recovers from a third party an amount equal to or greater than
the compensation paid by the employer/carrier to the employee. This is the result reached under
the express language of the federal workers' compensation statute and the case law construing
that statute. Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1982). In Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596, 600 (1981), the United States
Supreme Court noted:
There is no dispute about the parties' respective interests in either (a) a claim
asserted by [an employee] against a [third party] within the 6-month period follow-
ing acceptance of a compensation award, or (b) a claim asserted by the [employer]
against the [third party] after the 6-month period has elapsed. In the former situa-
tion, the [employee] has exclusive control of the litigation, any recovery in excess
of the amount required to pay the cost of litigation and to reimburse the employer
for the statutory compensation paid pursuant o the award belongs entirely to the
longshoreman. In the latter situation, the [employer] has exclusive control of the
litigation; any net recovery-after the compensation award and the litigation costs
have been recouped-must be shared 80% by the [employee] and 20% by the
employer.
(Emphasis added.)
5. 53 OKLA. B.J. 985, 987 (Okla. App. Apr. 13, 1982) (unpub. op.).
6. 512 P.2d 137 (Okla. 1973).
7. 282 P.2d 759 (Okla. 1955).
8. 190 Okla. 643, 126 P.2d 257 (1942).
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the Colonial Baking Company, brought an action against Lee Stinchcomb to
recover damages for personal injuries suffered in an automobile collision that
plaintiff alleged was caused by Stinchcomb's negligence. The plaintiff filed a
claim with the State Industrial Commission and was awarded compensation
for the injuries he sustained in the collision. The insurance carrier paid the
award and filed its petition in the Crain action, seeking to recover $2,007
from Stinchcomb, which was the amount paid to Crain by the insurance car-
rier. The jury returned a verdict for the insurance carrier. On appeal, the
defendant argued that upon payment of the Industrial Commission's award
to Crain, an assignment of the cause of action was inadvertently executed by
Crain to a party other than the insurance carrier. The defendant maintained
that such an improper assignment was insufficient to authorize the prosecu-
tion of the action by the insurance carrier.
The court found it unneccessary to address this argument. Instead, it held
that "independent of any provision in our Workmen's Compensation Law,
said insurer was subrogated to the claim of the injured workman as against
the defendant tortfeasor whose negligence was responsible for the injuries
sustained by the employee, and was thereby entitled to maintain this action in
its own name."'9
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on a statement in Staples v.
Central Surety & Insurance Corp.,'0 wherein the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated: "It is a well recognized rule, supported by a great weight of
authority, that, where one has been subjected to liability, and has suffered
loss thereby, on account of the negligence or wrongful act of another, the
one has a right of action against the other for indemnity."" In Staples, an
employee of one Bush was injured by a boiler explosion allegedly caused by
the negligence of the Staples Drilling Company. The employee was paid
compensation by the employer's insurance carrier. The insurance carrier then
brought an action in federal court to recover from Staples the amount paid
by it to the injured workman. Staples argued that the insurer could not bring
the action in federal court, but the court held that independent of the provi-
sions of section 44, the insurance carrier was authorized to maintain the
action under the doctrine of subrogation. Thus, Stinchcomb and Staples
apparently established the rule in Oklahoma that either the insurance carrier
or the employer, whichever compensated the injured worker, could maintain
an action under the doctrine of subrogation independent of the provisions of
the workers' compensation statute.
Other Cases
Several other cases in Oklahoma also appear to stand for this proposition.
In State Insurance Fund v. Smith,'2 the court held that an insurance carrier,
9. Id. at 645, 126 P.2d at 259.
10. Id., citing 62 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1932).
11. 62 F.2d at 653.
12. 184 Okla. 552, 88 P.2d 895 (1939).
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upon payment of the Industrial Commission's award to an injured employee,
had its remedy against the alleged third party tortfeasor in the manner
pointed out in Staples.'
3
Decided contemporaneously with Stinchcomb was Parkhill Truck Co. v.
Wilson.'" While this case did not deal directly with an insurance carrier's in-
dependent right to subrogation, the court did make clear that an employee
should not receive a double recovery. The court stated: "In no event, with or
without election, with or without assignment, with or without the payment of
compensation during the time the common law action for negligence is being
prosecuted can the injured employee have the benefits of double compensa-
tion.," 5
Another case that followed the rule of law laid down in Stinchcomb was
DeShazer v. National Biscuit Co.'6 In DeShazer the court held that the
respondent employer was entitled "herein under the statute and independent
of the statute" 'I to proceed against a third party tortfeasor for any amounts
of compensation paid by the employer to an employee negligently injured by
the third party.
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Leedy," employee Leedy was negligently in-
jured by a third party and received compensation benefits pursuant to an
order of the State Industrial Commission. Travelers Insurance Company paid
the compensation and sought to intervene in the employee's common law ac-
tion against the third party predicated upon the same injuries. After holding
that the insurance carrier was not barred by the statute of limitations from
intervening in the suit, the court dealt with the third party's argument that
the employee had not followed the statutory procedure under section 44(a)
for pursuing his common law remedy, and thus the insurance carrier could
not be subrogated to the amount it had paid under the Act. The court
dismissed this argument, holding:
Travelers is subrogated to the extent of the compensation pay-
ment. [S]ection 44(a) provides the preliminary and procedural
steps prerequisite to the fixing of liability under the Workers
Compensation Act for personal injuries caused by the negligence
of a third party. The statute is for the protection of the employer
and the insurance carrier in their right to subrogation. Leedy did
not follow the required procedure. Disregard of the statutory rule
will not serve to destroy Travelers' right to subrogation. [Citations
omitted.]"
The foregoing cases appeared to establish firmly the right of an insurer to
13. Id. at 554, 88 P.2d at 897.
14. 190 Okla. 473, 125 P.2d 203 (1942).
15. Id. at 476, 125 P.2d at 207.
16. 196 Okla. 458, 165 P.2d 816 (1946).
17. Id. at 460, 165 P.2d at 818.
18.'450 P.2d 898 (Okla. 1969).
19. Id. at 900.
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bring an independent action for subrogation. However, the court of appeals
in Russell v. Bill Hodges Truck Co.20 held that there was no right to subroga-
tion independent of the workers' compensation statute. In so holding, the
court relied on two cases, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Associates
Transports, Inc.21 and Updike Advertising System v. State Industrial Com-
mission.22 The court's reliance on Aetna is particularly confusing and will be
examined first.
In Aetna the plaintiff's assured sustained personal injuries and property
damage when her car was hit by an Associates Transports' truck. The plain-
tiff paid the assured for the damage to the car and notified Associates that it
had paid the loss and was claiming subrogation rights pursuant to its
insurance policy. Subsequently, the assured filed suit against Associates for
damages arising out of the accident. The parties eventually settled and the
assured executed a general release. The settlement was made without notice
to the plaintiff and without obtaining a release from the plaintiff. Plaintiff,
the insurer, then filed an action against Associates and its insurer to recover
the amount it had paid to its assured. The trial court entered judgment for
the defendants, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed, and the Oklahoma
Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, holding that the "plaintiff, upon pay-
ing the loss, became subrogated to the extent of the amount paid, to the
assured's right of action against the tortfeasor; plaintiff is entitled to main-
tain this action in its own name; the release executed by the assured did not
defeat the plaintiff's subrogation rights. ... 23
In Russell the court of appeals' reliance on the Aetna case for the proposi-
tion that compensation insurers' subrogation claims are the creatures of and
subject to legislative discretion is mystifying because Aetna involves neither
section 44 nor worker's compensation. In addition, the Aetna court, though
mentioning both Stinchcomb and its polar opposite, Updike Advertising
System v. State Industrial Commission, in the body of the opinion, appears
to follow the rationale of Stinchcomb in allowing the insurer to maintain the
cause of action in his own name.
As mentioned, the other case relied on by the court of appeals in Russell is
Updike. In that case the employee, while driving his car on company
business, was struck and killed instantly by another vehicle. Updike's widow
filed a wrongful death action against the driver of the other vehicle and
subsequently settled with him for $10,000. The claimant also was awarded
compensation by the State Industrial Commission for $13,500 against the
employer, Updike Advertising System, Inc. Updike Advertising System and
the insurance carrier petitioned a review of the reward.
Basically, the petitioners argued that section 44(b),24 which denies
20. 53 OKLA. B.J. 985 (Okla. App. Apr. 13, 1982) (unpub. op.).
21. 512 P.2d 137 (Okla. 1973).
22. 282 P.2d 759 (Okla. 1955).
23. 512 P.2d 137, 139 (Okla. 1973).
24. 85 OKLA. STAT. § 44(b) (1951) provides: "There shall be no subrogation to recover
money paid by the employer or his insurance carrier for death claims or death benefits under this
Act from third (3d) persons .... .
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employers and insurance carriers' subrogation rights in death benefits cases,
was unconstitutional. The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected this argument
and in doing so made some bold statements inconsistent with Staples, Stinch-
comb, and their progeny. In disagreeing with the petitioners' proposition, the
court stated:
There would be no subrogation without statutory provision. Such
subrogation was provided by the Legislature in the original
Workmen's Compensation Act as to the only liability provided
therein and that was for loss of earning capacity by reason of in-
jury to specific members of the body or permanent total dis-
ability. Without this provision no employer and no insurance
carrier would have had subrogation.2"
In so holding, the court restated a definition of subrogation initially given
in State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. Mobley2 6:
The doctrine of subrogation is governed and controlled in its
operation by principles of equity, rather than by strict legal rules,
and one of the conditions of subrogation in all cases, in the
absence of specific contract, is that the subrogee discharge the
obligation of another for the protection of his own rights."
Under this definition, the court reasoned that an employer could have no
subrogation at common law because by paying the death benefits, he did not
discharge the obligation of another for the protection of his own right.
Instead, the employer was bound to pay the death benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Act regardless of whether the death was caused in
whole or in part by the wrongful act of another. The court further stated that
the provision did not make an arbitrary distinction between personal injury
cases and death cases because the employer received benefits when the
legislature took away from those who received death benefits the right to sue
the employer for wrongful death and also limited the employer's liability
under the death benefits provision to $13,500.28
It is important to note two items in regard to the Updike decision. First,
the majority opinion failed to mention Stinchcomb or any other Oklahoma
case that previously had dealt with and specifically addressed this issue. Fur-
thermore, the Leedy case was decided after Updike. Second, although the
language of Updike is broad, its application to a personal injury case is not
wholly persuasive because Updike was a death benefits case.
A 1980 Oklahoma case further emphasizes the difference between personal
injury and death benefits cases in regard to the employer's and the compen-
sation insurance carrier's common law right to subrogation. In Earnest, Inc.
25. 282 P.2d 759, 763 (Okla. 1955).
26. 208 Okla. 342, 255 P.2d 945 (1949).
27. Updike Adv. Sys. v. State Indus. Comm'n, 282 P.2d 759 (Okla. 1949), citing 208 Okla.
at 345, 255 P.2d at 948.
28. 282 P.2d 759, 763 (Okla. 1955).
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v. LeGrand,2" the Oklahoma Supreme Court again confronted the issue of
whether, in death benefit claim cases, the employer and the insurance carrier
had a right of subrogation against the negligent third party. In holding that
they did not, the court found that the language of section 44, although incon-
sistent,3" as a whole prohibited such right.
The court also rejected the argument that there was a common law right of
subrogation in favor of an employer for payment of death benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Act. The court noted that the right to obtain death
benefits and to pursue a wrongful death action was purely statutory and did
not stem from the common law. The court reasoned: "How, then, can a
common law right of subrogation exist in death benefit claims cases when no
common law right of action for death existed?"' 3' This logic does not apply
to personal injury cases because a common law action for personal injury
did, indeed, formerly exist. In fact, in Earnest, in support of their argument
that there was a common law right of subrogation in favor of an employer
who has paid death benefits, the petitioners cited Staples, Parkhill, Stinch-
comb, Leedy, and Aetna. The court responded: "A review of these cases
clearly shows that in each case the claim in question under the Workmen's
Compensation Laws was for personal injury and not death. We think this
distinction is extremely material . . . 3,
Thus, in refusing to overrule Updike, the Earnest court implicitly recog-
nized that Updike, like Earnest, only applies to death benefits cases and that
the law regarding personal injury cases is still controlled by Stinchcomb and
its progeny.33 A final reason given by the court of appeals in Russell for
denying the insurance carrier an independent right of subrogation was the
several amendments made to section 44 since the Stinchcomb decision.3 4
Amendments to Section 44
Section 44 has been revised three times since its inception in 1915 by
amendments in 1951, 1975, and 1977. Until the 1975 amendment, this section
29. 621 P.2d 1148 (Okla. 1980).
30. When 85 OKLA. STAT. § 44(a) (1978) was amended, the words "or killed" were added in
the provision providing for subrogation for the insurance carrier. However, this directly conflicts
with section 44(b), which denies the insurance carrier subrogation in death benefits cases.
31. 621 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Okla. 1980).
32. Id. at 1152.
33. The holding in Updike was also followed in New State Ice Co. v. Morris, 285 P.2d 855
(Okla. 1955) and Meadow Gold Dairy Prod. Co. v. Conly, 288 P.2d 1115 (Okla. 1955).
However, both cases were also death benefit cases and their application to personal injury cases
is questionable. Indeed, in Meadow Gold the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized the limited
application of Updike by stating:
An argument identical, for all practical purposes, with the above was dealt with in
the recent case of Updike Advertising System v. State Industrial Commission [cita-
tion omitted], decided since petitioners' brief was filed. It was therein rejected. In
doing so, it was pointed out that, as to the type of recovery, which the Death
Benefit Amendment of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides, there is no
right to subrogation either at common law or by statute ....
(Emphasis added). 288 P.2d at 1116.
34. 53 OKLA. B.J. 985, 987 (Okla. App. Apr. 13, 1982) (unpub. op.).
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remained consistent regarding: (1) the requirement that a worker elect
whether to take compensation under the Act or to pursue his remedy against
the third party; (2) the requirement of an assignment of the cause of action
to the insurance carrier if the worker elects to take compensation; (3) the
mandate that the insurance carrier contribute only the deficiency not
recovered against the wrongdoer; and (4) the requirement of written ap-
proval by the Workmen's Compensation Court of any compromise of the
worker's claim involving the subrogation rights of the insurance carrier. The
1975 and 1977 versions of section 44, which are nearly identical, retained all
of these protections of the insurance carrier, but added the requirements that
the insurance carrier should pay its portion of the expenses incurred in ob-
taining recovery for the worker and itself, and that the balance of the
recovery should be apportioned between the insurance carrier and the worker
in the same ratio that the amount of compensation paid bears to the total
recovered. No language in either the 1975 or 1977 amendments changes the
nature of the recovery or the elements of payment included therein that an
insurance carrier is entitled to recover by way of subrogation. It is important
to note that Earnest was decided after the 1977 amendment of section 44.
The court of appeals in Russell emphasized the fact that section 44 had been
amended several times since the supreme court's decision in Stinchcomb;
nonetheless, the Earnest court again implicitly recognized Staples and Stinch-
comb as the law regarding insurance carriers' subrogation rights in personal
injury cases.
Conclusion
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Russell erred by holding that section
44 of Title 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes preempts all other rights of subroga-
tion that may have existed at common law or otherwise for the benefit of in-
surance carriers and employers. A review of the law in Oklahoma on this
question, although somewhat muddled, tends to point in favor of allowing
employers and insurance carriers the right to maintain an action for subroga-
tion independent of the Workers' Compensation Act against a third party
tortfeasor in personal injury cases.
The leading case of Stinchcomb v. Dodson" answered this issue squarely
in favor of the insurance carrier's and the employer's right to subrogation.
Several cases since then have adopted the holding in Stinchcomb. Although
the holding in Updike Advertising System, Inc. v. State Industrial Commis-
sion 36 is squarely at odds with the holding in Stinchcomb, it is important to
realize that Updike was a death benefits case and its rationale is not ap-
plicable to a personal injury case. This important distinction between death
benefits and personal injury cases was further emphasized in the 1980
Oklahoma Supreme Court case of Earnest, Inc. v. LeGrand." In Earnest,
the court recognized that subrogation could not have existed at common law
35. 190 Okla. 643, 126 P.2d 257 (1942).
36. 282 P.2d 759 (Okla. 1955).
37. 621 P.2d 1148 (Okla. 1980).
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in death cases because there was no common law action for death, and thus,
refused to overrule Updike. However, the supreme court did recognize the
holdings of Staples, Stinchcomb, and their progeny as applied to personal
injury cases and thus implicitly limited the holding of Updike and Earnest o
death benefits cases. Because Russell was a worker's compensation case deal-
ing with personal injury, it is submitted that the insurance carrier did have a
right to subrogation independent of the provisions of the Workers' Compen-
sation Act.
Russell Hendrickson
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